Britain’s rail investigators have delivered their verdict on last year’s derailment at Audenshaw in Tameside. In an 83‑page report published on 24 December 2025, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) says a track fastener failure on a timber‑bearer bridge let the rails spread, leading to the crash and an eight‑week closure for repairs.

Just after 11:25 on Friday 6 September 2024, a Peak Forest–Salford aggregates service made up of two Class 66 locomotives and 24 loaded wagons crossed the short bridge over a public footpath at Audenshaw. The first ten wagons passed safely; the next nine derailed, with the last of those coming to a stand on the bridge itself. No injuries were reported.

Investigators found the track gauge had widened because screws securing the rail baseplates to the longitudinal wooden bearers had failed. On the right‑hand side of the curve, wagon wheels dropped into the widening gap between the rails. The bridge was fitted with a longitudinal bearer system rather than conventional sleepers and ballast.

Metallurgical testing showed several of those chair screws were already fatigued before the train arrived. RAIB recovered evidence of earlier failures in the same locations and found maintenance records noting at least three previous screw failures - including one before 2020 - with some required records missing altogether.

RAIB’s calculations conclude the screws, in the configuration used on this bridge, were not expected to last indefinitely even though train forces were below Network Rail’s stated limits. The longitudinal bearer system was installed in 2007, and increased traffic since 2015 accelerated fatigue.

Crucially, the failures were not picked up. RAIB says neither automated nor manual inspections were capable of reliably detecting this type of screw failure, and routine dynamic track geometry readings were within allowable limits, so no additional action was triggered.

The report highlights system weaknesses rather than a single mistake. Network Rail lacked effective processes for managing longitudinal bearer assets across design assurance, installation, inspection and maintenance. Locally, previous screw failures were neither recorded nor reported by the track team, and corporate assurance did not identify or correct that for years.

Eight recommendations follow: tighter assurance of components used in LBS designs; clearer guidance for design, installation, maintenance and failure reporting; stronger staff competence; better coordination between track and structures teams; deeper understanding of how the supporting structure’s condition affects track behaviour; a review of how changing traffic affects LBS risk and the inspection it needs; complete records of LBS configurations nationwide; and stronger internal assurance so inspection and maintenance records are accurate.

For Tameside residents the disruption was real: the railway at this point was shut for around eight weeks, and the public footpath beneath the bridge was closed for months while propping remained in place and a signed diversion was provided, according to Network Rail’s note to councillors in January 2025.

Why this matters for Greater Manchester is clear. This is an aggregates artery that helps keep the region building, and RAIB’s findings apply to similar timber‑bearer bridges across the network, not just Audenshaw. The branch stresses its role is to prevent future accidents rather than apportion blame; the next move now sits with Network Rail to respond and act.