“Every morning I wake up and look to see if it’s gone – but it never is,” said Joe Hart, 80, who has taken the long way round Sidmouth Street since the 6 September 2024 derailment on the bridge above his street in Audenshaw.

On 24 December 2025, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch published its final report. Investigators say nine of the train’s 24 wagons derailed on a bridge over a public footpath at 11:25 on 6 September 2024; no one was injured, and the railway at that spot was shut for around eight weeks. The derailment followed what RAIB calls a “loss of restraint of the track gauge between the rails,” which allowed wheels to drop into a widening gap.

RAIB found the track across the bridge used a timber longitudinal bearer system, with rails fixed to baseplates by screws. Metallurgical tests showed several screws had already cracked through fatigue before the train arrived. Calculations indicated the screw configuration on this bridge did not offer unlimited fatigue life, traffic growth since 2015 sped up the damage, and the LBS dated from 2007.

Critically, Network Rail’s inspections didn’t catch the problem. RAIB concluded that both automated and manual checks were not capable of reliably spotting this failure mode; routine dynamic geometry measurements stayed within standard limits, so no action was triggered. The report also notes earlier screw failures at the same locations had occurred, but the local track team neither recorded nor reported them, and assurance processes did not correct this over years.

Eight recommendations follow. RAIB wants stronger component assurance for LBS designs; clearer guidance on design, installation, maintenance and reporting of failures; improved competence for those managing LBS assets; better coordination between track and structures teams; deeper understanding of how the supporting structure’s condition affects the track; a review of how traffic changes alter risk and what to change in response; a complete national record of LBS configurations; and tougher assurance so records are accurate.

While trains were running again after the track rebuild, people under the bridge lived with fencing and diversions for months. Network Rail told ward councillors a temporary reopening would cost £200,000 over six months and “would not be the best use of our public funds,” adding, “We are very sorry for the disruption,” as it planned longer‑term strengthening.

This wasn’t a quiet siding. The service was running Peak Forest to Salford with aggregate - freight that feeds building sites across Greater Manchester. Locals know the location as the stretch between Denton and Ashton Moss, where the bridge sits above the footpath that splits Sidmouth Street in two.

For the North, the message is about maintenance standards, not finger‑pointing. RAIB highlights that day‑to‑day checks weren’t up to catching this specific screw fatigue and that record‑keeping was patchy. If Network Rail follows the report to the letter, expect better asset data, clearer accountability between disciplines and inspections that flag issues before the next heavy freight rolls through.

RAIB’s role, in its own words, is “to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety.” The test now is delivery: publish the fixes, publish the timelines, and tell Audenshaw when the last props can finally come out.